Abstract
Introduction
During the 1980s and 1990s inequality in earn ings and incomes increased considerably in New Zealand as in many of the industrialized countries. This rising inequality was coi ncident with the rapid diffusion of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), leading many commentators to believe that the latest phase of technological developments has been biased in favour of more-ski lled workers, and that the rise m inequality reflects the associated premium for skills.
However the number of experts in computing and related fields in New Zealand has been estimated at no more than four percent of the work force (Engc lbrecht , 200 I). It therefore seems implausible that the increasing inequa lity can be explained by the wages of ICT specialists alone.
For skill-biased technological change to be the cause of rising wage inequality, a much more general demand for higher ski lls throughout industries with rapid uptake of new technology would seem to be necessary. One way in which this might occur is by ICTs being indirectl y responsible through their effect on workplace organisation. A large proportion of the New Zealand workforce is employed in industries which have experienced substantial reorganisation, in part fo llowing the adoption of new technologies, and it is therefore plausible that widening earnings dispersion reflects the increased returns to the knowledge and skil ls requ ired to maximize the potential of the new work place. This paper reports the find ings of an investigation into the extent to which wage inequality is related to new technology and the extent to which it is correlated with skills and qualificati ons. Specifically it uses unit record data co llected by Statistics New Zealand in the June 2002 Income Supplement to the Household Labour Force Survey to estimate wage differentials in the entire New Zealand economy.
To explore the role of technical change I relate data on the industry use of computers from the 1996 Input-Output tables to the earnings dispersion. Quantil e regress ion was used to estimate how the proportion of industry s pe ndin~ on computing affects workers at the I o•h and 90 1 percenti les of the log wage distribution, and whether that log wage gap is wider in industri es making more i n~en s i ve use of computers. A significant assoc iation was found between greater use of computing and wider wage disparities, but this widening dispersion is full y explain ed by qualifications and occupations. This fin ding suggests that the widening dispersion reflects a mismatch of worker qualificati ons to industry needs, rath er than an y spec ific ICT effects. Section 2 of this paper reviews the international and New Zealand literature on inequality and technological change. The data and methods of analysis arc discussed in section 3, and Section 4 presents the findin gs of the quanti le regress ion estimates. Section 5 discusses some of the imp lications of these findings.
Review of the Literature
Over the 90 years from the 1880s to the 1970s the immense inequalities of the mid-19 1 h century were steadi ly eroded. The all -pervasive economic growth stemming from the spread of industrialization benefited all sectors of soc iety, but disproportionately helped those at the bottom of the distribution. The wages of lowski lled workers rose faster than the cost of li vi ng, and the inco me gaps between the top and the bottom of the distribution became narrower (Aghion. Garc ia-Pena losa and Caroli, 1998: Goldin and Margo, 1992) .
From about 1974 this pattern of growth wi th a lowinco me bias was abruptly reversed (Karoly, 1993; G rccnwood and Yorukoglu , 1997) . The growth rate slowed down sharply in almost all the more deve loped coun tries, and in many cases the spread of benefits became much less equitab le. Such growth as did occur was large ly captured by house holds in the upper deciles of the distributi on (Karoly. 1993) . and numerous studies in many OECD countries show a marked widenin g of in come di sparities in the last two decades. (Goldin and Margo. 1992: Acemoglu. 200 I) . Th is widening of in equalit y is parti cularl y true for the United Kin gdom and the United Sti.ltes (Freema n and K..~t z, 1995: Gottschal k ami Smeeding. 1997 ). but h t~s also been found in New Zea land ( Borland. 2000: Dixon. 199R : Chatterjee, Podder and Mukhopadh a) a. 2003 ).
In so me co untries. notabl y the United States, the lower decilcs .::utTered a dec line in abso lute as well as relative terms (J uhn. Murph y and Pierce. 1993: Nickcll. 1998; Slaughter. 1999 R1:-1ng Inequ ality may resu lt from cha nges in the di~tribut i on of earnings within groups of workers with :-imibr charJcteri stics or from changes between groups. The bet\\ een-group changes follow from changes in the compos ition of the workforcc and from changes in the earnings premium associ ated with various characteristics. Se' era I ex isting studies in New Zea land look at '' <Xk fo rce compos iti on changes. for example due to the gHl \\'th of the 'information workforcc' (Engclbrecht, 200 1 L 3nd also look at changes in between-group returns tu charJc tcristics. such as schooling (Maani . 1999) .
The rising inequality of the last 25 years con tai ns elements of both between group and within group di:-pcrsi on (Aghion. Garcia-Pcne losa and Caroli. 1998: Burjas. 2000) . and a number of commentators have tried tu est:1bli sh which is the more sign ificant. Jcff Borland concluJeJ that within group inequality was the more significa nt in Australia (Borland, 1999) and probably also in New Zei.lland ( 8orland, 2000) . Th is New Zealand fi nding was generally supported by Hec tor and Gibson ( 2002 ) . who used changes in income inequality as rc p~1rted in the Popu lation Census and fo und declini ng \\'ithin-group inequality for low skill workers, but substantially rising within group inequality among the higher skill workers. However, between group inequality is probably the more critical from a policy perspective, since there is some evidence that within group inequality is transitory while between group inequality 1s more permanent (Aghion and Howitt, 2002 ) .
Since the end of World War 11 the numbers of school leavers continuing to tertiary education has been rising steadi ly in OECD countries (Mach in , 200 I) including New Zealand (Maan i, 2000) , and during the 1960s and 1970s this was accompanied by a decl ine in the returns to education as the supply of more qualified workers outstripped demand (Juhn , 1999) . The recent widening of the wage differentials at a time of increasing supply indicates that the demand for skills has been rising even faster than supply (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Pryor and Schaffer, 1999) . Moreover, since 1980 not only has the earni ngs dispersion increased, the demand for the less skill ed has plummeted (Berman , Machin, 1998: Levy and Murnane, 1996; Nickel! and Bell, 1995) .
The period when wage disparities began to widen was also a peri od of rap idly changing technology in the workplace, leading many commentators to believe that skill biased technological change is the prime mover. However the techno logical changes could be a coin cidence, and a number of other reasons such as declining union power and changing industrial structures in the face of globalization have been advanced (Levy and Murnane, 1992: Borland, 2000) .
During the 1990s the trade explanation was widely seen as the most plausible alternative to the skill-biased technological explanation (Wood, 1995 : Rodrik , 1997 , but the advanced industri al countri es trade far more with each other than they do with the less developed world, and the trade ex planation has largely fallen out of fa vour as most commentators have concluded that the volumes of trade arc too sma ll to have generated inequa lity effects of the magnitude observed (Bhagwati . 1995 : Krugman, 1994 . Moreover the trade exp lanat ion fits particul arl y poorl y with the ew Zealand experience, where ex ports are largely co ncentrated in the less tcchnolog ized primary industries, and if anything trade appears to reduce inequal ity (Bal lingall and Lattimore, 2002) .
Deunionizati on and other labou r market changes are another possible contributory fac tor. However it has been estimated that the reduced union membership only explains some 15 percent of the observed rise in wage ineq uality (Haskel. 1999) and most au thors agree that labour market institutions generate at most only a small part of th e effect (Card . Kramarz and Lcm ieux, 1999; Simonazzi and Vi lla, 1999; Webster and Tscng, 2002) .
Skill biased technologica l change, while not the proven cause. is currently the prime cand idate Johnson. 1995: Gold in and . Consequently, there has been considerable di scussion in the economics literature on the different types of technological change. Some tec hnologies. especia lly those relating to specific industri es, evolve progressively and display steady incremental improvements rather than more radical innovations (Freeman, 1992: 77) . ln contrast, "General Purpose Technologies" or GPTs (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; David, 2000) spark a revolutionary change in modes of production, affecting countless industries. Examples of GPTs include steam power in the nineteenth century and e lectrifi cation at the turn of the century (Helpman, 1998) . Many authors have suggested that information and communication technologies represent the latest of these G PTs ( Brynjolfsson and H itt, 2000) , with the general purpose nature of cheaper and better ICT facilitating eo-invention of more and more complex uses (Bresnahan, 1999: F402) .
Whether a new general purpose techno logy, s uch as ICT, raises or lowers the demand for s kills can only be determined empirically. Either outcome is possible depending on which segment of the labour market is most affected and the nature of the impact. Consequently, the effect of new technology on wage differentials depends on whether the new techno logy comp lements skilled workers or substitutes for them. As Krueger ( 1993 : 34) explains:
" In the former case [ com plementarity] the computer revolution is likely to lead to an expans ion in earnings differentials and in the latter case [substitution] it is I ikely to lead to compression in skill-based diffe rentials."
A link between increasing use of technology and greater returns to education is widely accepted as very plaus ible, since returns to schooling have been found to be higher in industries making greater use of advanced tec hnology (Alien, 1996} , and the rate of skill upgrading tendi ng to be greatest in industries with greater computer investment (Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998; Johnson, 1997) .
However, the evidence suggests that rather than a s imple comp1ementarity between computer use and individua l workers' ski lis, there is a complementarity between skilled workers and an automated workp lace (Bresnahan, 1999; DiNardo and Pischke, 1997) . A more educated workforce is more adaptable to new ways of working (Shu1tz, 1975; Bow1es, Gintis and Osborne, 200 1 ) and computerization appears to be strongly assoc iated with occupational restructuri ng (Brynjo lfsson and Hitt, 2000; Wolff 2002 ). Moreover, the evolving patterns of inequality have been markedly different in different countries, even between countries at a s imi lar stage of technological development such as the United States and Canada (Murphy, Riddell and Romer, 1998) . It therefore seems likely that the rising skill premium is a reflection of better educated workers enjoying a comparative advantage in the implementation o f new technology (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987; Chun, 2003 ) .
Data and Methods
Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) conducts a quarterly Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS), to which they add an annual Income Supplement each June . T he present study uses the Income Supplement for June 2002 , which contains extensive detail on the various sources o f income, including income from wages, investments and we lfare payments, for a cross-section of some 29 000 New Zealanders aged 15 and over. In order to focus on wage effects those respondents were excluded who reported no income from earnings, or unrealistic earnings (less than $4.00 per hour}, reducing the sample size to 12 9 19 .
Not only does the Income Survey distinguish between earnings and other forms of income, it also provides information on normal hours of work per week and earn ings derived from those hours. O ne o f the deri ved values provided by SNZ is the usual hourly wage fro m the primary job. This fi gure provides a robust basis for the analys is of industry, occupation and s kill level effects on wage di spers ion, since it is hourly wage rates whi ch most accurately reflect the wi lli ngness of employers to pay fo r part icular ski lls.
Measures of Industry Use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT)
T here is no generally accepted best proxy for the uptake of new technologies. Some proxies that have been used include R & D expend iture , age o f capi tal, use of patents, and expend iture on 1CT equipment and services (Bartel and Sicherman, 1999) . T he present study uses industry ex penditure on computers and computer services drawn from the 1996 inter-industry tables compiled by Stati stics New Zealand, which are the most up to date tables available. These tables arc publ ished at two leve ls of dctai I, but the more detailed 126 industry by 2 10 product vers ion was chosen because it provided separate commodity data fo r computer hardware, and computer soft ware and services. Statistics New Zealand provides a concordance between thei r 126 industry group ings and their 49 industry groupings. Neither of these exactly matches the 62 industry di vision used for the H LFS data. so a new concordance between the 62 and the 126 industries was created (Concordance ava il able on request).
Of the 58 industries there were five that had total computer and computer services purchases in excess of $ 1 OOm in 1996. Wholesale and retail trade is the biggest w ith a total of approximate ly $370m, followed by banking, other fin ancial services and business services, each at over $250m, and government adminis tration at $ 180m. When purchases of computers and computer services arc expressed relati ve to the s ize of the industry (in terms o f total outlays), the sectors wi th the most intensive use o f computers arc banki ng, fin ance, insurance, bus iness services and public admini stration.
At the other end of the scale the input-output tabl es do not record expenditure less than $ 1 M. and there were 11 industries with software and computer services ex penditure and 25 with hardware purchases below this threshold in 1996. These are typically the pnmary industries, such as fanning, fi shing and forestry .
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Occupations, qualifications and skill levels of workers The HLFS Income Supplement includes infonnation on the highest qualification attained for each of the workers sampled. There are ten skill levels identified in the HLFS. However levels 9 and I 0 together represented less than 0.6 percent of the sample, and some skill levels (eg. 5 and 8) are rather ill-defined, so for the purposes of the present study the groupings were compacted into five, as detailed in table I. The very small, totally unspecified level 10 was merged with level 6, as that is both the most numerous class and it straddles the median.
Re grouped 
Method of analysis
The analysis considers both within group and between group inequality. To study within group inequality, quantile regression (QR) was used, the 9-th quantile (0< 9<1) of the log wage (w) distribution for the i-th individual being specified as:
Where OLS shows deviation from the mean of a sample, QR permits estimation of the median (9 = 0.5) or any other ~antile . By comparing the trend in the log wage at the 10 1 percentile with the trend in the log wage at the 90 1 h percentile it is poss ible to see whether wage dispersion is increasing or decreasing as an explanatory variable changes.
To investigate the extent to which the computing effect differs between groups of similar workers the various industries were flagged as high-tech or not high-tech, according to whether industry spending on computing exceeded 0.8% of total industry expenditure. Th is approach is similar to that of Engelbrecht and Xayavong (2004) , but the cutoff was chosen to divide the worker sample into two large groups (61% o f the sample work in industries below this cutoff), rather than finding the median point of the industries themselves.
OLS regressions of log wage on the interaction of this computing intensity dummy with the five qualification Figure 1 : Wage dispersion by worker age level dummies were then estimated, to see whether computer intensive industries show higher returns to qualifications. These OLS regressions were also estimated controlling for characteristics such as occupation and cognitive ski lls. Where Qi is the qualification dummy and HiTech is the computer expenditure dummy, the specification is:
In wage = I:diQi + I:Pi(Qi*HiTech) + Ui Findings Figure I presents quanti le regress ion estimates for the IO'h percentile of the work force (P l 0) and the 90'h percentile (P90), s imply regressing log wage on age and age squared, without any controls for industry or skill effects. The Figure Worker age
Computing effects
The dispersion was then estimated between the I o•h percentile and the 90'h percenti le according to the proportion of industry expenditure on computing. The simplest specifi cation included controls for age and age squared, because of the strong relationship between age and wages out lined above. This revea ls a marked tendency for wage dispersion in New Zealand to be wider in those industri es which are s ignificant users of new technology, than it is with in industries which make little use of new technology, though the R 2 figure of 0.17 is too low to draw strong conclus ions about the correlation (Table 2) . The effect of a difference of 3.968 in the coefficient on computing expenditure is to increase log wage dispersion by 0. 19 log points between those industries whic h have negligible computing expenditure and those which are co mputer intensive (4.8% of total expenditure). This log wage difference of 0. 19 represents a 2 1% increase in P90: PI 0 dispersion. 11 owevcr, once the regrcss1on was re-estimated inc1)rporating an occupation dummy, a qualification dummy and a variable representing cognitive skill , the premium attac hed to the computing effect disappeared.
or these three the occupation dummy was found to be the one \\'h ich had the strongest exp lanatory power, with the cocf'licicnt on comruting expenditure becoming almost the same at the I 0 1 percenti le as it is at the 90 1 h . This implies tha t the wage dispersion over industries which is corre lated with computer expenditure is in fact large ly explained by the occupations of the workers. When a dummy variable for qualifications is also incorporated into the equations the coefficient on computer expenditure actually becomes smaller at the 90th percentile than it is at the I Oth. Figure 2 shows the coefficients on the industry proportion of computing expenditure at the I Oth and 90th percentiles, for fi ve different spec ifications. The fi rst pai r of bars shows the estimation when no control variables are added, while the second pai r incorporates a dummy variable for occupation . The third pair incorporates a further dummy for qua lifi cati ons and the fourth pair is the third with the add it ion of a variable for cognitive skills. The fifth pair is the fourth wi th the incorporation of variables for marital status, sex, ethnicity, local government region of residence, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent was a migrant to New Zealand. The error bars indicate one standard error plus or minus. Computing Effect
Controlling for occupation and qualifications reveals exactly the same pattern whether or not the control for cognitive skill is also incorporated (specifications 3 and 4 in Figure 2 ). Additional controls were brought into the model for interpersonal skills and motor ski lls as calculated by Pappas (200 I), but the coefficients on computer expenditure remained the same as they were in the simpler specification. The coefficients on interpersonal skills and motor skills are negligib le, while the small positive coefficients on cogniti ve skills are offset by smaller positive coefficients on the dummies for qualifications and occupation.
A number of additional control variables were introduced into the model, for worker characteristics which could possibly have significance: sex, ethni city, marital status. migrants status and local government region of residence (specification 5 in Figure 2 ), but the coe ffi cients on computing expenditure change very little. There is a slight reduction of the computing effect for the I o•h percentile workers and a slight increase in the computing effect fo r the 90'h percentile workers, but the relationship with wage dispersion remains almost totally explained by qualifications and occupation.
An earli er study using Population Census data (Hector and Gibson , 2002) found a tendency fo r the computer intensity of industri es to be associated with hi gher withingroup inequa li ty for workers with higher qualifications. To check whether this effect was confi rmed by unit record data, the sample was divided into five groups by level of qua lification, and quanti le regressions were estimated at the I o•h and 90'h percen tiles fo r each qualification level in turn.
In the simplest spec ification. controlling only for age and age squared. QR estimates show a substanti al increase in wage dispersion associated wi th computer intensity. for those workers with no qual ifi cations or only schoo l certifi cate. However. for those workers who have higher sc hooling or vocational or uni versity qualifications computer intens ity is assoc iated wi th compression of the wage differential. The sa me pattern is apparent when cogniti ve ski ll is also controll ed for. but the coeffi cients on computing are somewhat muted (Figure 3 . Error bars show one standard error plus or minus). For workers who have not completed university study but who have a vocational qualificati on the computing effect is sma ller, but again shows a narrow ing of the PI O: P90 gap.
- Figure 3: The effect of computing intensity on within-group inequality, by highest qualification achieved, controlling for cognitive skill.
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Betll'een group inequality
Finally. in order to examine changes m between-group inequality. industries were divided into two groups according to whether their expenditure on new techno logy exceeds 0.8% of total industry expenditure. OLS regressions on the interaction of qualifications and technology were est imated. to see whether the return to qualifications was greater in the more computer intensive industries.
These regressions were run separately for male and female workers. For ma le workers the higher technology industries were associated with greater returns to qualifications at all qualification levels. with the effect most marked at the middle levels. For examp le. a male worker with School Certificate gains a premium of 6. 78% O\'er a male worker wi th no qualifications. but if they also work in a high technology industry that premium is The other male and female wage prem ia associated with work in hi gh tec hnology industri es are shown in Table 3 . For fema le workers the pattern was similar to the male pattern up to the middle levels, but for uni versity graduates the relationship was reversed, with high technology industries associated with a lower return to qualifications.
The regressions were re-estimated including a control for cogniti ve ski lls, and the patterns were found to be similar to the uncontrolled speci fication . However for male degree holders the wage premium was greater, and for female degree holders the red uction in wage premium was halved. 
Summary and Implications
In New Zealand, the more computer intensive industries show significantly greater wage dispersion than industries which make little use of new technology, a pattern which has also been found in other countries (Alien, 2001; Katz, 2000) . However the relationsh ip between wage dispersion and industry use of new technology is fu lly explained when controls for education and occupation are introduced into the equations. Evidently it is not so much the industry use of technology as such that is driving the wage premium, as the industry need for a better educated and more appropriately qualified workforce.
There is considerable within group compression at the higher educational levels. But for those workers with no qualifications beyond School Certificate the use of technology is associated with a marked widening of the P 1 O:P90 wage gap, tending to confirm the intuitively plausible idea that workers with few qualifications enjoy little demand in technology intensive industries.
Testing whether computer intensive industries show higher returns to qualifications also revea led a softening of the technology effect at the top of the qualification range. For male workers there was a higher return to education at all levels, but for female workers this was only true in the mid range, and for women university graduates high technology industries are associated with wage compressiOn.
If New Zealand is to lift productivity through greater use of new technology it will probably be necessary to raise the level of education, especially of those sections of soc iety most at risk of missing out. The returns to skill are correlated with those industries which are major users of new technology, implying that the general level of education in New Zealand is likely to be a constraint on the speed at which new technology can be further expanded.
The gaps between the bottom and the middle of the qualification range now appear to be more signifi cant than between the middle and the top, with the workers who have no qualifications beyond School Certificate being the most di sadvantaged. This in turn implies that an increased commitment to public education could be expected to have benefici al outcomes if it were aimed at raising the standards of the least educated.
If inequality is exacerbated by changing labour demand rewarding the well-positioned, there is a serious risk of se lf perpetuating polarisation. In addition , if within group inequality is temporary but between group inequality is more permanent (Aghion and How itt, 2002) , there wou ld seem to be a strong case for an increased public commitment to lifting the workers at the bottom of the qualification range. In the long run it may well prove less expensive to put greater effort now into the preparation of a more appropriately educated workfo rce, one in which more workers can take advantage of the opportun ities presented by more technologized industries, than to cope later with the consequences of a significant minori ty excluded through a Jack of the skill s whi ch are needed to succeed in a changed environment.
